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To address the shortage of cross-cultural research on putative, panhuman 23 
features of moral judgement, Fessler et al. [1] conducted a study with samples drawn 24 
from seven different societies. There is much to be praised in their efforts, which 25 
advance the recent debate initiated by Kelly et al. [2] regarding whether people view 26 
harmful transgressions as independent of authority (wrong regardless of the view of 27 
any legitimate authority) and universally wrong (wrong in all places and times), as 28 
argued by Turiel and his colleagues over the last four decades, and by ourselves in the 29 
context of this debate [3-6].  30 
Fessler et al. claim that people do not conceive harmful transgressions as 31 
authority independent and universally wrong because people’s third-party moral 32 
judgements evolved to “increase individual fitness within local culturally constructed 33 
social arenas”, which implies that their judgements should be parochial: they should 34 
not be sensitive to wrongdoings distant in space and time and they should be sensitive 35 
to the opinion of local authorities. Moreover, Fessler et al. claim that their new study 36 
supports their moral parochialism hypothesis, providing a “powerful challenge” to 37 
positions like Turiel’s and ours. Here, we argue that Fessler et al.’s findings can be 38 
interpreted in a way that is quite consistent with our position, and that provides 39 
instead a powerful challenge to their evolutionary, moral parochialism hypothesis.  40 
We [3, 4] entered the aforementioned debate by offering an empirically-41 
guided methodological critique of the research of Kelly et al. We also proposed a 42 
deflationary reformulation of Turiel’s original hypothesis in which harmful 43 
transgressions are understood as authority independent and universally wrong when 44 
they are perceived to involve injustice and basic-rights violations [5, 6]. One major 45 
criticism we had of Kelly et al.’s study is that it presented participants cases of 46 
harmful actions, such harm as military training or as punishment, that many 47 
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participants viewed as justifiable [3, 4]. Fessler et al. have taken a large step in 48 
addressing this earlier criticism by employing vignettes depicting harmful actions that 49 
appear to involve “clear and substantial harm, violations of rights and/or injustice.” 50 
Indeed, in this respect, their new study provides an excellent test of our hypothesis.  51 
Their study included seven cases of harm ostensibly involving injustice, such 52 
as a woman being raped or a man battering his wife without provocation. They 53 
presented participants with such cases, and assessed their moral judgements of the 54 
harmful acts on a 5-point badness/goodness scale: “How good or bad is what A did?” 55 
(“Extremely bad”; “Bad”; “Neither good or bad”; “Good”; “Extremely good”). After 56 
answering this first question, participants were provided with probes concerning 57 
authority dependence, temporal distance, and spatial distance [for details, see 1]. For 58 
each of these questions, participants were assessed again with the same 5-point 59 
badness/goodness scale. The aim of the task is to probe whether participants will 60 
change their initial judgements of wrongdoing, given the approval of a local authority 61 
or the fact that the action occurred in a distant time or place.  62 
In the context of the task, evidence consistent with our hypothesis are 63 
instances where a participant initially thinks the harmful acts are wrong (i.e., 64 
“Extremely Bad” or “Bad”), and then does not reverse their position to not-wrong 65 
(i.e., “Neither good nor bad”, “Good” or “Extremely good”) following the authority, 66 
temporal and spatial distance probes. If the majority of responses involve retention of 67 
the initial judgement of wrongdoing, this would be consistent with our account, but 68 
not with the parochialist account. Fessler et al. do not describe their results in a 69 
manner that could test our hypothesis, i.e., that present the amount of responses that 70 
involve non-reversals of the initial judgement of wrongdoing. Table 1 presents such a 71 
breakdown of Fessler et al.’s results. As can be seen, the vast majority of responses 72 
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from all seven field sites involve non-reversals of the initial judgement of 73 
wrongdoing, and this was true across all three probes.  74 
 75 
Table 1  76 
Percentage of responses that involve non-reversals of the initial judgement of 77 
wrongdoing, i.e., “Extremely bad” or “Bad” responses that were not changed to 78 
“Neither good nor bad”, “Good” or “Extremely good,” in each of the probes and 79 
field sites, across seven different types of harmful actions.   80 
 81 
 
 
Authority 
Probe 
Temporal 
Probe 
Spatial 
Probe 
Tsimane 88% 77% 84% 
Shuar 94% 92% 92% 
Karo Batak 96% 91% 91% 
Storozhnitsa 98% 89% 88% 
Sursurunga 96% 97% 98% 
Yasawa 87% 86% 83% 
California 86% 90% 89% 
  82 
 83 
Obviously, there is still a non-negligible minority that did reverse their initial 84 
judgement of wrongdoing. However, there are several ways of explaining these 85 
minority responses that are compatible with our hypothesis [3-6]. For example, it is 86 
possible that, in response to the authority’s approval of the act, participants inferred 87 
that the authority possessed some deeper insight about the event (e.g., additional 88 
reasons why the man slapped his wife), which led them to transform their construal of 89 
the injustice of the act. Since the authors did not measure the perceived injustice of 90 
the act before or after the presentation of the authority dependence probe, it is unclear 91 
whether participants who reversed their judgement also changed their construal of the 92 
injustice of the event.  93 
Moral Judgements Are Not Parochial 5 
When Fessler et al.’s data are viewed in this alternative manner, it becomes 94 
apparent that moral-parochialist responses represent a tiny minority cross-culturally. 95 
This provides a powerful challenge to their evolutionary argument about moral 96 
parochialism, since one cannot support an evolutionary argument about the nature of 97 
moral judgements with a cross-cultural minority. Instead, their findings become more 98 
consistent with an alternative evolutionary hypothesis, based on mutualism [7], which 99 
argues that intuitions about authority independence and universalism follow from the 100 
panhuman disposition to think in terms of reciprocal social contracts that obligate 101 
people to respect the basic interests of others by not selfishly harming one another [6]. 102 
However, Fessler et al. may reply that their perspective is predicated on the 103 
idea that people’s moral judgements cannot be dichotomized in terms of judging that 104 
an action is wrong (i.e., “Extremely bad” and “Bad”) or not-wrong (i.e., “Neither 105 
good nor bad,” “Good,” and “Extremely good”) as we did in our interpretation of their 106 
results, since from their perspective these judgements should be understood in terms 107 
of a “graded continuum” of condemnation [1]. Moreover, they may argue that their 108 
statistical analysis shows that the authority dependence, temporal and spatial distance 109 
factors explain a substantial amount of the graded reduction of condemnation in 110 
participants’ judgements when you take into account the entire 5-point scale.  111 
We are sceptical about modelling normative judgements simply on a graded 112 
continuum (in terms of psychological validity) [6]. We would argue that it is plausible 113 
to suppose that participants parse the 5-point badness/goodness scale categorically in 114 
terms of the act being wrong or not wrong. We do not see much psychological 115 
significance in shifts from “Extremely bad” to “Bad” in the context of their scale. 116 
This is supported by the fact that a comparable number of responses increased in their 117 
degree of condemnation as that decreased in their degree of condemnation, among 118 
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those responses that retained an “Extremely bad” or “Bad” judgement: in this group, 119 
averaging across the three probes, 10% shifted from “Bad” to “Extremely bad”, while 120 
16% shifted from “Extremely bad” to “Bad” (74% retained the same level of 121 
badness). 122 
Even setting aside this conceptual issue, we argue that a graded-continuum 123 
approach to the data would still challenge their evolutionary hypothesis. To support 124 
their evolutionary hypothesis, they would have to show that the majority of responses 125 
in most field sites reduced the initial judgement. Yet, again, Fessler et al. do not 126 
describe their results in a way that addresses the issue of majority responses. Table 2 127 
presents the amount of responses that did not reduce in condemnation as a result of 128 
the authority dependence, temporal and spatial distances probes, either because the 129 
initial badness judgement was maintained (e.g., “Bad”/”Bad”) or because there was an 130 
increase in the level of condemnation (“Bad”/”Extremely bad”). In other words, this 131 
table represents the amount of responses that are inconsistent with the parochialism 132 
hypothesis, under the graded-continuum approach.  133 
 134 
Table 2 135 
Percentage of responses that did not reduce, to any degree, the initial badness 136 
judgement. Thus, responses that changed from “Extremely bad” to “Bad” are not 137 
factored in the percentages.   138 
 139 
 Authority 
Probe 
Temporal 
Probe 
Spatial 
Probe 
Tsimane 69% 59% 67% 
Shuar 80% 78% 75% 
Karo Batak 70% 67% 63% 
Storozhnitsa 69% 56% 57% 
Sursurunga 83% 81% 82% 
Yasawa 75% 75% 73% 
California 81% 81% 80% 
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 141 
As can be seen, even when accepting the graded-continuum approach, the 142 
clear majority of responses in all field sites, and across all three probes, are 143 
inconsistent with the parochialism hypothesis. These results again provide a powerful 144 
challenge to their hypothesis about the evolution of parochial morality, as such a 145 
claim depends on showing that most people across societies are inclined to reduce 146 
their condemnation of harmful acts when a local authority approves or the actions 147 
occur in another place or time.  148 
In sum, although we praise Fessler et al.’s use of cross-cultural samples to test 149 
competing models of moral judgement, we question their analysis of the data. When 150 
analysed in the manner we outlined here, their findings become consistent with our 151 
theoretical proposal [6], not with theirs [1]. We leave it to the broader scientific 152 
community to decide which is the most appropriate approach to their data.  153 
154 
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